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ARGUMENT
The City has appealed the decision of the Civil Service Commission ("the
Commission") on the grounds that it failed to properly apply the analysis established in
the case of Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 2000 UT App 235.
Specifically, the Commission failed to analyze the question of whether the charges
warrant the sanction imposed by breaking that inquiry down into two sub-parts: First, is
the sanction proportionate and, second, is the sanction consistent with previous sanctions
imposed by the department pursuant to its own policies. Kelly, 2000 UT App at \ 21.
Because it failed to apply the appropriate test to aid it in its examination of the Chiefs
disciplinary decision, the Commission took away the Chiefs discretion to impose
progressive discipline and choose the appropriate punishment based upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.
Although the respondent, Officer Measels, acknowledges that the two-part Kelly
inquiry is apt, he contends that the Commission properly considered both sub-questions
before rendering its decision. With respect to the first inquiry, Officer Measels asserts
that the Commission adequately considered the issue of the proportionality of the
sanction simply because the Commission had before it "the whole record" when it
evaluated the proportionality of the sanction. (Aplee Br. at 13). This huge generality is
unpersuasive because it relies solely on an assumption that the Commission did, in fact,
consider the record. Despite Officer Measels' conjecture that the Commission reviewed
the full record, there is no ready evidence that it did.

A review of the Commission's findings (R. 30-35) makes this clear. The record
shows that, in addition to the violation for which he received the 30 hour suspension,
Officer Measels had three prior sustained violations. (R. 37, Ex. 3, pp. 172-173). Yet, the
Commission notes only one prior violation for inconsiderate contact.

It makes no

mention of the sustained violation of the abuse of police authority. Chief Dinse testified
that the incident leading to those violations was "substantial." (R. 36 at p. 14). If the
Commission was looking at the full record, as Officer Measels assumes it did, the
Commission would have addressed both violations rather than mentioning only the
violation of the inconsiderate contact policy. Officer Measels also had received a written
reprimand for violating department policy requiring thoroughness and accuracy of
reports. There is nothing in the Commission's decision to suggest that the Commission
considered this violation either. The Commission made no findings concerning whether
or not Officer Measels' entire disciplinary history. The fact that the Commission referred
only to the one violation of the Inconsiderate Contacts policy does not indicate whether
or not the Commission considered the rest of Officer Measels' disciplinary history or
whether it failed to consider that history because it did not understand or apply the
dictates of review established in Kelly.
Although the chief fully explained the reasons he imposed the 30 hour suspension,
the Commission made no mention of any of those reasons. The Chief testified that
Officer Measels had not "gotten the message" (R. 36, p. 142) regarding how he should
conduct himself.

The Chief found it significant that Officer Measels did not accept

responsibility for his actions or seem to understand that he had done anything wrong. (R.

36, pp. 142-143).

Thus, the Chief, after weighing all the facts and circumstances

concluded that another written reprimand was not appropriate and imposed discipline that
was still within the range of sanctions imposed on others.
Although Officer Measels' previous misconduct was serious, the Commission,
with the singular focus on the consistency factor, ignored Officer Measels' prior
violations of the abuse of police authority policy and the report policy. Apparently, the
Commission only considered as a valid variable the one prior sustained violation of the
Inconsiderate Contacts policy, a policy closely related to the Personal Contacts policy at
issue in this case.

In Kelly, this Court recognized that a link between instances of

misconduct is not necessarily required when weighing the full record. Kelly, 2000 UT
App 235 at f27. Therefore, the Commission should have looked at Officer Measels'
whole prior disciplinary history, not just the one prior incident of related conduct.
The Commission's sole focus in reaching a conclusion on the second question was
whether or not the 30 hour suspension without pay was consistent with discipline
imposed on others who violated the Personal Contacts policy or the related Inconsiderate
Contacts policy. The Commission's rigid reliance on the consistency of discipline as the
determinative factor as to whether or not the Chief abused his discretion is not supported
by the law. As stated by this Court in Kelly, the "consistency element simply requires the
Department to abide by its own policies, as outlined in Lucas v, Murray City Civ. Service
Commission, 949 P. 2d 746, 761 (Utah App. 1997), and as recognized in the
Department's own regulations." Kelly, 2000 UT App 235 at f 28.

The Kelly Court

pointed to Salt Lake Police Department policy 3-11-02-00 (now D38-02-00.00) which
states:
Positive corrective action should be considered before the imposition of
sanctions. The following factors should be considered when determining
the degree of disciplinary action needed:
5.

Consistency of discipline.1

Kelly, 2000 UT App 235 at f 28. Thus, inconsistency in Officer Measels' discipline
when compared to the discipline imposed on others for similar conduct is but one factor
in determining if the Chief abused his permitted discretion. Id. Despite Officer Measels5
assumption that the Commission's review was more thorough than its decision reflects,
the only evidence in the Commission's decision indicates that for the Commission, the
consistency of discipline was the only factor that was considered.
The Commission's staunch position that no discipline can be imposed except that
which was previously imposed for similar conduct raises that consideration to an
inviolate rule. The City believes that position incorrectly presents the state of the law.
Like most employers, the City uses progressive discipline whenever possible.
Progressive discipline is a well-accepted policy (See Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service

1

That Salt Lake City police department policy has been renumbered as D38-02-00.00. In
addition to consistency of discipline, the other factors include: (1) Nature of the violation
and the circumstances in which it occurred; (2) the impact the behavior has on the
Department; (3) mitigating circumstances; (4) length of service and work record; (5)
consistency of discipline; (6) extent to which disciplinary action may play a rehabilitative
role; (7) attitude and conduct of the employee throughout the investigation and personnel
interview; (8) adequacy of Department training needs or practices and Department
policies and procedures.

Commission, 949 P. 2d 746, 761-62 (Utah App.1997)) which by its very nature considers
the cumulative nature of offenses, whether or not related.

The use of progressive

discipline is committed to the Chiefs discretion, based upon the severity of the offense.
Lucas, 949 P. 2d at 762. In this case, the Chief clearly concluded that the severity of the
instant matter, especially when coupled with Officer Measels' prior misconduct, justified
the imposition of progressive discipline in the form of a 30 hour suspension without pay.
The Commission, focusing only on the consistency element, failed to recognize the
importance of progressive discipline and the discretion of the Chief to weigh all the
circumstances and determine the appropriate discipline.
The Commission's ruling appears to argue against the very concept of progressive
discipline. Given the Commission's position, no officer could ever receive more than a
written reprimand for a first or second violation of the Personal Contacts policy unless
such a violation included the use of profanity and physical violence. (R. 33). If profanity
or violence was part of the misconduct, then, according to the Commission's decision, a
suspension within the range of 20 to 50 hours would be appropriate (R. 32-33).
Applying this reasoning, had Officer Measels used profanity with Mr. Hansen
after stopping him in "retaliation for the oinking noise Mr. Hansen madeff (R. 31) and
while detaining him "far too long" in a stop that could "constitute police harassment" (R.
31), the Commission would have found that his 30 hour suspension was "within the 20 to
50 hour range" (R. 32-33) and, as such, would have been within the Chiefs discretion.
Such reasoning strips the Chief of his discretion to impose discipline based on the totality
of the circumstances, as allowed under Kelly, and, instead, forces a formulaic response to

discipline. Surely an officer who "took police action in retaliation for an oinking sound,"
who conducted a stop that constitutes "police harassment" and who engaged in
"deplorable," "unprofessional conduct" can be disciplined by the Chief of Police within
the 20 to 50 hour range for a violation of the Personal Contacts policy despite the fact
that the officer did not use profanity. Any other conclusion ignores the Chiefs ability to
impose progressive discipline and nullifies the Chiefs discretion to manage his police
force and impose discipline based upon the full record in each case.
A review

of

Officer

Measels'

appropriately deal with the public.

conduct

demonstrated

unwillingness

to

No employee should be granted the right to

repeatedly display material errors in judgment that affect his employer and the public
because the Chief is without the discretion to weigh the officer's conduct and determine
whether another written reprimand or suspension "within the 20 to 50 hour range" should
be administered in order to deter future misconduct.

Nowhere is the concept of

progressive discipline and the Chiefs discretion to address police misconduct more
applicable than in the area of law enforcement where public safety and public
expectations demand more. The "severity of the offense will determine the steps required
for progressive discipline." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission, 949 P.2d
746, 762 (Utah App. 1997). The Commission's decision fails, not only on legal grounds,
but on public policy grounds as well.
The Commission's formulaic approach that fails to give due consideration to the
gravity of the misconduct, the history of the officer, and the full record in each case sends
the wrong message to the public and police officers alike. Chiefs of Police must have the

discretion to impose discipline given the circumstances attendant to the misconduct rather
than be handcuffed to potentially irrelevant or ineffective precedent. While conduct that
is similar in time, content and consequences should be treated substantially similar,
experience tells us that those situations are uncommon. For instance, there are countless
ways to violate the Personal Contacts policy. However, police officers, their conduct,
their motivations and justifications and the impact of such conduct all vary from case to
case, even when they all have violated the same police policy. Police Chiefs must be
given broad discretion and deference in measuring the nature of officer misconduct and
its impact upon the Department's public safety mission.

The law recognizing this

discretion is clear and well established. Lucas, 949 P.2d at 761 (Discipline is within the
sound discretion of the Chief.

We hold that the use of progressive discipline is

committed to the Chiefs discretion based on the Chiefs determination of the severity of
the offense.); In re Discharge of Jones v. Tooele County, 720 P. 2d 1356, 1363 (Utah
1986) (The sheriff must manage and direct his deputies and is in the best position to
know whether their actions merit discipline.). The test that was adopted in Kelly allows
the Chief to demonstrate a "fair and rational basis" for any inconsistency of discipline
while maintaining the necessary flexibility to impose discipline based upon an officer's
entire record.

The Chief acted within the discretion vested in him by established

precedent and, by failing to make findings that would indicate that the Commission
properly evaluated the matter, as established by Kelly and other precedent, the
Commission acted "outside the law" and substituted its own discretion for that of the
Chief. Thus, it was the Commission that abused its discretion, not the Chief of Police.

By failing to acknowledge any of the Chiefs reasons for imposing the discipline
he did, the Commission ignored the Kelly test, instead demanding rigid conformity with
other discipline regardless of the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Because the Commission failed to properly apply the law when it addressed the
question, do the charges warrant the sanction imposed, the Commission abused its
discretion by stepping outside the legal boundaries set forth in Kelly. This Court should
overturn the Commission's ruling and affirm the Chiefs 30 hours suspension as discipline
for Officer Drew Measels.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2004.

Senior City Attorney
Attorney for Petitioner

Q

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 14th day of December, 2004, she
caused two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
to be hand-delivered to:
Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission
c/o Secretary Pattie Terzo
451 South State Street, Room 115
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Respondent
and the undersigned further certifies that on the 14th day of December, 2004, she caused
a two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER to be
mailed, first class postage prepaid, to:
Todd M. Shaughnessy
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Drew Measels who was
the petitioner before the Civil Service Commission

Mi. L
SANDRA STANGER

9

